Exchange Rate Pass-Through, Exchange Rate Volatility, and Exchange Rate Disconnect by Michael B. Devereux & Charles Engel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










This paper was prepared for the Carnegie Rochester Conference, Carnegie Mellon University, November
16-17, 2001. Devereux thanks SSHRC for financial assistance. Engel thanks the NSF for funding. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2002 by Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engel.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.Exchange Rate Pass-Through, Exchange Rate Volatility, and Exchange Rate Disconnect
Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engel
NBER Working Paper No. 8858
April 2002
JEL No. F3, F4
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the hypothesis that high volatility of real and nominal exchange rates may
be due to the fact that local currency pricing eliminates the pass-through from changes in exchange rates
to consumer prices.  Exchange rates may be highly volatile because in a sense they have little effect on
macroeconomic variables.  The paper shows the ingredients necessary to construct such an explanation
for exchange rate volatility.  In addition to the presence of local currency pricing, we need a) incomplete
international financial markets, b) a structure of international pricing and product distribution such that
wealth effects of exchange rate changes are minimized, and c) stochastic deviations from uncovered
interest rate parity.   Together, it is shown that these elements can produce exchange rate volatility that
is much higher than shocks to economic fundamentals, and `disconnected' from the rest of the economy
in the sense that the volatility of all other macroeconomic aggregates are of the same order as that of
fundamentals.
Michael B. Devereux Charles Engel
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of British Columbia University of Wisconsin
997-1873 East Mall 1180 Observatory Drive
Vancouver, BC Madison, WI 53706-1393
V6T 1Z1 Canada and NBER
and NBER Tel: 608-262-3697
Tel: 604-822-2542 Fax: 608-263-3876
Fax: 305-946-6271 Email: cengel@ssc.wisc.edu
Email: devm@interchange.ubc.ca 
  Empirical evidence indicates that nominal exchange rate changes are not fully passed 
through to goods prices.  In fact, it appears that consumer prices are very unresponsive to 
nominal exchange rate changes.
1  An implication of this finding is that the “expenditure-
switching” effect of exchange rate changes might be very small.  That is, a change in the nominal 
exchange rate might not lead to much substitution between domestically-produced goods and 
internationally-produced goods, because the relative prices of those goods do not change much 
for final users.   
  If the exchange rate change has little effect on the behavior of final purchasers of goods, 
then it may take large changes in exchange rates to achieve equilibrium after some shock to 
fundamentals.  For example, if there is a shock that reduces the supply of foreign goods, a very 
large home depreciation might be required in order to raise the relative price of foreign goods 
enough to reduce demand sufficiently.  That is, low pass-through of exchange rates might imply 
high exchange-rate volatility in equilibrium.  That intuition was first expressed by Krugman 
(1989), and explored by Betts and Devereux (1996).  
  However, fully-articulated equilibrium open-economy macroeconomic models with 
sticky nominal prices (in the style of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)) have found that exchange-rate 
volatility is difficult to generate even when there is little exchange rate pass-through.  While 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) assume complete pass-through of exchange rates to prices because 
they assume that nominal prices are set in the currency of the producer, several studies have 
extended the Obstfeld-Rogoff framework to the local-currency pricing case.
2  Under local-
currency pricing, firms set a price in their own currency for sale to households located in their 
country, but set a price in foreign currency for sales to foreign households.   
                                                 
1 See Engel (1993), Parsley and Wei (2001), or the references cited therein. 
2  See Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) and Devereux and Engel (2000).  
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  The purpose of this paper is to explore the conditions under which local-currency pricing 
might induce a high level of exchange-rate volatility.   By impeding the linkage of goods prices 
across countries, local currency pricing leads to deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP), 
and therefore, in principal, may be able to explain high exchange rate volatility following the 
intuition of Krugman.  But there are some major caveats to this conclusion.  Much of the paper is 
devoted to understanding them.  First, if international financial markets allow for full risk-
sharing across countries, then exchange rates will be determined by a risk sharing condition, 
despite the fact that local currency prices are independent of exchange rates.  Second, even if risk 
sharing is limited, the linkage of assets prices through bond markets will impose a tight limit on 
the degree to which exchange rates can move.  Third, even without any international asset trade 
at all, local currency pricing does not guarantee high exchange rate volatility because wealth 
effects of exchange rate changes through firms’ profits will limit the degree to which the 
exchange rate can change.  Finally, while within a particular model of local currency pricing it 
may be feasible to choose a parameter configuration that delivers a high level of exchange rate 
variability (e.g. Chari et al. 2000), this parameterization may have quite counterfactual 
implications for other macroeconomic variables.  Our aim is not just to explain high exchange 
rate volatility, but, in the spirit of the original Krugman discussion, to understand both why 
exchange rate variability can both be high and not matter for real variables.  In this respect, we 
are influenced by the seminal empirical findings of Baxter and Stockman (1990), Flood and Rose 
(1995).  They show that high exchange rate volatility under floating exchange rates is not 
obviously tied to or reflected in high volatility of other macroeconomic variables.  Exchange 
rates are a puzzle not just because they are volatile, but also because they seem to be  
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`disconnected’ from the real economy, as discussed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), and Duarte 
and Stockman (2001)
3.   
  Given these prerequisites for explaining exchange rate volatility, the paper constructs a 
model in which a combination of three factors is key in generating exchange rate volatility that is 
much higher than the volatility in underlying macroeconomic shocks, or the volatility in other 
endogenous macroeconomic variables.  The first factor is the presence of local currency pricing: 
exchange rate changes do not pass through to goods prices in the short run.  
   The second feature is the presence of heterogeneity in the way that products are sold and 
prices are set in international commodity markets.  We assume that some firms market their 
products directly in their export market, but others use foreign distributors.  When an exporting 
firm uses a foreign distributor, it sets the price in its own currency.  The distributor takes on the 
exchange-rate risk – buying goods priced in the exporter’s currency, and selling in the 
consumers’ currency.  In those cases, a home currency depreciation bestows a positive wealth 
shock on the distributor. 
  We posit that exporters are more likely to set up foreign offices and undertake their own 
distributing activities for large consumer markets, but they are more likely to sell to firms that 
specialize in distributing for sales to smaller markets.  We show that under this configuration, the 
wealth effects of foreign exchange rate changes are minimized, potentially generating very high 
exchange rate volatility even for small shocks.   
  Finally, however, even with this structure of price setting and international commodity 
distribution, the degree of exchange rate volatility is restricted by arbitrage in international assets 
                                                 
3 In many respects, our paper is similar to Duarte and Stockman (2001).  They emphasize that shipping costs, 
leading to deviations from PPP, and volatile risk premiums, leading to deviation from UIRP, are joint requirements 
in the understanding of high exchange rate volatility.  In our emphasis on the nature of international pricing and 
product distribution, as well as the nature of the breakdown in UIRP (see below), however, the channels explored in 
our paper are quite different.   
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markets.  When we allow for trade in non-contingent nominal bonds across countries, 
unanticipated movements in the exchange rate (in the presence of local currency pricing) 
generate a real interest rate differential across countries that itself tends to restrict the movement 
of the exchange rate.  But this channel depends critically on the uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIRP) condition, which (aside from a negligible risk-premium term) continues to hold in a 
model of local currency pricing and heterogeneity in international goods distribution.  In light of 
this, we extend our model to allow for the presence of foreign currency traders whose 
expectations of future exchange rates are conditionally biased.  In this, we follow closely the 
recent paper of Jeanne and Rose (2000), showing how `noise-traders’ can generate high 
exchange rate volatility in a monetary model of the exchange rate.   
  Our results show that the presence of all three factors – local currency pricing, 
heterogeneous international distribution of commodities, and `noise traders’ in foreign exchange 
markets – can potentially generate a high-frequency volatility of the exchange rate that is 
completely out of proportion to the underlying monetary shocks to the economy.  Moreover, 
while exchange rate volatility is ultimately tied to volatility in the fundamental shocks to the 
economy, the exchange rate can display extremely high volatility without any implications for 
the volatility of other macroeconomic variables.   We find that the volatility of consumption, 
GDP, the real interest rate, and the current account may be quite low (of the same order of 
magnitude as fundamentals), while at the same time the volatility of the exchange rate may be 
much, much higher.  In this sense, the exchange rate becomes `disconnected’ from the real 
economy.  
  The paper is organized as follows.  In section 1, we develop a baseline two-country 
general equilibrium model that is used throughout the paper.  In that section we also show in 
detail why the assumption of complete international assets markets cannot provide an empirical  
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explanation for exchange rate volatility. In section 2, we illustrate the determination of the 
exchange rate under incomplete markets, local currency pricing, and heterogeneous international 
distribution in commodity markets.  In order to develop the intuition, we restrict ourselves 
simply to a one-period horizon in that section, however.  Section 3 extends the model to a 
dynamic (infinite horizon) environment, introducing a role for `noise traders’ in foreign 
exchange markets.   
 
1.  The Basic Model of Exchange Rate Determination 
  Here we outline the basic features of the modeling framework.  There are two countries; 
`home’ and `foreign’.  Households in each country maximize expected utility, which is a 
function of consumption, real balances and labor.  They take prices and wages as given.   
The representative household in the home country is assumed to maximize 
0
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, and  0 > ρ .  Compared to other papers in the 
literature (Bacchetta and Van Wincoop, 2000, Chari et al. 2000), we make the assumption of 
separability in consumer preferences over consumption, real balances, and labor supply.  In our 
model, the key features of exchange rate volatility will come from factors that are essentially 
independent of the preference specification.  While allowing for non-separability on its own 
could alter some of our results (possibly generating a higher predicted level of exchange rate 
volatility for a given volatility of monetary policy for instance), it would not solve the `exchange 
rate disconnect’ problem.   
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C is a consumption index that is a CES function of goods produced at home (Ch) and in 
the foreign country (Cf): 
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The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign consumption aggregates is ω .  We 
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where  λ >1.   P
M  are domestic real balances, and L is the labor supply of the representative 
home agent. 
  The price index, P, is defined by 
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 There  are  n − 1  identical households in the foreign country.  Their preferences are similar 
to home country residents’ preferences.  The terms in the utility function involving consumption 
are identical in the home and foreign countries.  The functional form for real balances and labor 
are the same as for the home country residents, but, for foreign residents, they are functions of 
foreign real balances and foreign labor supply.  We denote foreign aggregate consumption by C
* 
and the foreign price level by P
*.  Throughout the paper an asterisk superscript indicates a 
foreign quantity.   

















































 =  













h h h h C P di i C i P
0 ) ( ) (   =
1
) ( ) (
n f f f f C P di i C i P  
 
1.1 Complete Markets 
  The choices available to households depend on the opportunities for financial market 
trade.   The first result we obtain is a negative one.  We will show that if there is a full set of state 
contingent nominal assets traded, then we cannot obtain high exchange rate volatility, or at least 
high volatility that is disconnected from the rest of the economy.  When households of each 
country can purchase a full set of state-contingent nominal bonds, Chari, et al (2000) show that 













where St  is the home currency price of foreign currency, and  0 Γ  is a constant, depending on 
initial conditions.
4   Consumption will differ across the two countries only to the extent that there 
are changes in the real exchange rate.  
  In addition to the consumption demand equations listed above, we can derive the money 
demand equation for the representative home-country resident: 
(1.2) 












                                                 













q is the equilibrium state contingent nominal pricing factor. The trade-off 
between consumption and leisure is given by: 
(1.3) 
ψ ρ η t t t t L C P W =    
  Government increases the money supply with direct transfers.  Home and foreign money 
transfers are determined as random injections, and these represent the only source of uncertainty 















    
The conditions for the foreign country are analogous.   
  Using (1.2) and (1.4), it is easy to demonstrate that the nominal interest rate is time 




− .  Then without any further specification of the model, we can 
derive an equilibrium expression for the exchange rate.  Equations (1.1) and (1.2) yield: 





S = . 
According to this relationship, the exchange rate is proportional to relative money supplies.  That 
is, the exchange rate is no more volatile than the fundamentals. 
  The striking thing about this solution is that it does not depend at all on how prices are 
set, or how persistent is price stickiness.  The exchange rate is equal to the relative money 
supplies whether or not nominal goods prices are fixed in the currency of households or 
producers, and no matter how long it takes prices to adjust.  Indeed, the equation holds whether 
or not there is any nominal price stickiness.   The intuition for the result is that the marginal 
utility of nominal balances in the home and foreign countries are 
t M
χ    and  *
t M
χ ,  
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respectively.  The complete set of nominal assets ensures that the marginal utility of money, 
expressed in a common currency, is equalized.  This relationship is expressed in equation (1.5). 
With complete markets, then, there can be no excess volatility. 
 
1.2 Extending the Preference Specification 
  Is this conclusion sensitive to our particular preference specification?  The fact that 
exchange-rate volatility is independent of how prices are set is an artifact of our assumption that 
real balances enter the utility function logarithmically.  For instance, we could allow a more 
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the same steps leads us to the exchange rate solution  
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It is no longer true, in the case  1 ε ≠ , that the nominal interest rate is constant.  Therefore, the 
exchange rate will in general depend on the response of home and foreign nominal interest rates.  
This precludes an analytic solution to (1.6).  But we may linearize (1.6) in the neighborhood of a 
deterministic steady state.  Define  ln ln t x XX =− .  Then using the condition for uncovered 
interest rate parity, we may obtain the approximate solution 
(1.7)     ) (
1
) )( 1 ( ) ( 1
* *
t t t t t t t t s s E
i
p p m m s − + − − + − = + ε ε  
where i is the common steady state nominal interest rate in each country.  Now we take the 
analogue of condition (1.4) to be that the log of the money supply is a random walk in each 




tt t p sp =+ , and the solution for equation (1.7) is the same as  (1.5), so the exchange 
rate is proportional to fundamentals, even in this extended model.   
On the other hand, if there is complete LCP pricing, then the solution to equation (1.7) 
gives the exchange rate response: 












For ε >1, the exchange rate can display volatility in excess of fundamentals, and volatility under 
LCP pricing exceeds that under PCP pricing.  Note however that since i is the nominal interest 
rate, it would take extremely large values of ε  to generate a very high exchange rate response to 
money shocks. Moreover, high exchange rate volatility can only be generated if the marginal 
utility of consumption is very volatile (from equation (1.1).)  In this setting, a high value of ε  
implies a high response of the marginal utility of aggregate consumption to monetary shocks
5. 
 
2.  Incomplete markets and Local Distribution
6 
  Having established that a complete market set-up cannot give an adequate description of 
exchange rate volatility, we now turn to a setting with limited financial markets.  For the rest of 
the paper, we maintain the assumption that consumer prices are set (in advance) in local 
currency.  But we allow for differences in the identity of the price setters of consumer goods.  
Domestic firms are all owned only by domestic residents, and foreign firms by foreign residents.  
But there are two types of firms in each country: producers and distributors.  Each producer sells 
its product directly to residents of its own country without benefit of a distributor.  But when 
marketing its product to the other country there are two possibilities.  Home producers, for 
                                                 
5 Note that in a one period economy, which can be interpreted as the case i →∞ , the elasticity of the exchange rate 
fundamentals is equal to ε , which in principle may be very large.  But again, this implies a high volatility of the 
marginal utility of consumption.  
6 For the rest of the paper, we return to the original preference specification of section 1.   
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example, might choose to sell directly to foreign households or they might sell to a foreign-
owned distributor.  The foreign distributor then sells the home-produced product to foreign 
households. 
  If the home producer sells directly to foreign households, it sets prices in the foreign 
currency.  However, if the home producer sells to foreign distributors, it sets a price in home 
currency.  The distributor absorbs the exchange-rate risk because it buys at prices set in the home 
currency, but it sets prices for foreign consumers in foreign currency. Distributors use no 
resources.  Their only role is to purchase goods from producers priced in the producers’ 
currencies, and then sell those goods to consumers at a price set in consumers’ currencies.   
  In particular, our model deliberately eliminates any “expenditure switching” role for 
exchange rates, in order to highlight the role of the contribution of local-currency pricing to 
exchange-rate volatility.  Some studies (McCallum and Nelson (2000), Obstfeld (2001)) have 
allowed for a difference between import prices and consumer prices as we do, but posit that the 
distributors have a wide scope for substituting between imports and domestically-produced 
alternatives when the exchange rate changes.  The distributor in those models combines imports 
and home products to make the final consumer good, and can vary the proportion of the 
intermediate products in the final good.  In essence, we have made the extreme assumption that 
the distributor has zero elasticity of substitution between imports and home products. 
  Producers manufacture output from labor, using a linear technology.  Each production 
firm is a monopolist, and sets prices in advance to maximize expected discounted profits.  Sales 
are demand determined.  We assume that distributors sign binding contracts ex ante to distribute 
however much of the good is demanded.  After the state of the world is realized, distributors 
might find themselves either making pure profit or pure loss on each unit that they sell.  
However, they cannot exit the market if they are making a loss.  We also assume that there is  
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free entry ex ante into the distribution market.  That means that prices by distributors are set so 
that expected discounted profits from distribution are zero in equilibrium
7.  
Producers 
First let us look at the situation of the home producing firm. A home producer j sets price 
) ( j Pht  in home currency for sales to the home market.  If the home producer distributes directly 
to a foreign household, she sets a price  ) (
* j P
P
ht  in the foreign currency.  But if she sells to a 
distributor, she sets a price  ) ( j Qht  in the home currency.  The foreign distributor buys the good 
at ) ( j Qht  per unit, and sells to households at a price  ) (
* j P
D
ht  set in foreign currency
8.  The price 
index of home goods for foreign consumers
*
ht P  is given by  () λ λ λ θ θ − − − − + = 1
1




ht ht P P P  
where θ  is the fraction of home firms that sell directly to households in the foreign country. 

























) ( , which represents the demand for product j  of the n home 
households multiplied by the price of product j.  If the producer markets directly to foreign 
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 in domestic 
currency.  This comes from taking the demand for product j of the 1-n   foreign households, 
multiplying by the foreign price of product j and by the exchange rate to express in domestic 
currency.    
                                                 
7 This is essentially the set-up we used in Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999).  In that paper, we assumed that all  
exported goods were sold by distributors.  In a complete markets setting, we showed that this implied an equivalent 
allocation to the situation where exports are sold directly to the foreign consumer.  By contrast, here we allow some 
exports to go through distributors, and some to be sold directly by producers to households, and of course, we do not 
assume that markets are complete.    
8 Under complete markets, we would have ) ( ) (




ht = , (see Devereux, Engel and Tille 1999).    
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.  The represents the demand for product j by all (1-n) 
foreign households, multiplied by the domestic currency price that is charged to foreign 
distributors.   
Distributors  
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, since the foreign producer j sells her good denominated in 
foreign currency at the price 
* () ft Qj .  
Profits 
Now imposing a symmetric equilibrium, so that producers in any sub-category always set 
the same prices, we can calculate the total profits received by the n home country firms, of 
whom θ  directly market to foreign households, and 1 θ −  sell to foreign country distributors, as 
well as the 1 n −  home firms who engage in distributing foreign products.  Total profit income 
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The first expression represents revenue from the home market.  The second and third 
expressions represent revenue from the foreign market for the direct marketers and the firms that 
use a foreign distribution network, respectively.  The fourth expression represents profits of 
home distributors, and finally the fifth expression measures total wage costs.  
Foreign Firms 
  Analogously, foreign producer k sets the price  ) (
* k Pft  for sale to foreign residents.  A 
fraction 
* θ  of foreign firms directly sell their product to home households at a home-currency 
price of  ) (k P
P
ft , while the remaining 
* 1 θ −  sell their product to home-based distributors at a 
price of  ) (
* k Qft  in foreign currency.  The home distributors sell those goods to home consumers 
at the price  ) (k P
D
ft .  We have  () λ λ λ θ θ − − − − + = 1
1




ft ft P P P . Foreign revenues may be 
evaluated in the same way as before, and total profits to foreign households are described by an 
equation analogous to (2.1).  
  Prices are set by home and foreign producing firms and distributors to maximize 
expected discounted profits.   The full equilibrium of the dynamic model with incomplete 
markets requires a set of assumptions about the types of financial assets that households can 
trade between countries.  But before we analyze the nature of international financial markets, it is 
instructive to explain how the structure of commodity distribution alone helps to generate high 
exchange rate volatility in an environment of local currency goods pricing.  We do this by 
examining the special case of a one-period horizon.    
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2.1  Static model 
  In a one period version of the economy, there is no international asset trade of any kind, 
since bond trade can only take place over time.  We may define an equilibrium as follows
9.  
Expression (2.2) and (2.3) describe money market clearing and the labor supply curve for the 
home country: 
(2.2)                
ρ χ t t t C P M =       
( 2 . 3 )        tt t t WP C L
ρψ η = . 
  The budget constraint facing a typical home household is: 
(2.4)      tt t tt t t PCMW L T += + Π + .  
Here,  t Π  are profits from domestic producers and distributors as defined in (2.1)  and  t T  is the 
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The left hand side of this equation represents total home country output.  The right hand side is 
demand for home country goods from home households, from the foreign households who buy 
directly from the home firms, and by foreign households who buy from foreign distributors.   
  Conditional on pre-set prices, a static equilibrium may be defined by equations (2.2) and 
(2.3), and their counterparts for the foreign economy, the home country budget constraint (2.4) 
(recognizing the money market equilibrium condition  tt M T = ),  and the goods market clearing 
condition (2.5) with its counterpart for the foreign economy.  This gives set of seven equations 
                                                 
9 Technically, we obtain a one period outcome by setting  0 β = in the previous model (without the risk-sharing 
conditions).    
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that give implicit solutions for the seven variables 
** * ,,,, , tt tt tt CCWW LL, and  t S . Combining 
(2.4) with the profit expression (2.1) gives the equation: 
(2.6) 
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In combination with (2.2) and its counterpart for the foreign economy, equation (2.6) determines 
home and foreign consumption, and the nominal exchange rate.  Equation (2.6) is simply the 
balance of payments equilibrium in the one-period world economy (to see this, note that in the 
special case when 
* 1 θθ == ,  1 ω = , and prices set by direct marketers and distributors are 
identical, the condition just says that the nominal value of home spending should equal the 
nominal value of foreign spending; i.e. 
**
tt t t t PCS P C = ).  
  Notice that the exchange rate plays two roles on the right hand side of (2.6).  A 
depreciation will increase home country revenue by increasing the earnings of domestic firms 
who sell their products directly to foreign households and pre-set prices in the foreign currency.  
On the other hand there is a negative wealth effect of exchange rate depreciation arising from the 
reduced profits of home country distribution firms, who have to purchase foreign goods at a 
higher domestic cost.  It is the conflict between these two wealth impacts of exchange rates that 
is critical to the results below.  
  In general the response of the exchange rate to monetary shocks will depend on the levels 
of pre-set home and foreign prices.  However, we can again determine the degree of exchange 
rate volatility by examining the properties of the model in the neighborhood of a deterministic 






















 .  Then taking a log linear approximation of 












  If all goods were directly marketed to households (i.e. 1
* = = θ θ ), exchange rates would 
be more stable in this setting than under complete markets.  The response of the exchange to 
changes in the relative money supplies is 
ρ
1
.  A reasonable assumption is that  1 > ρ , so the 
exchange rate elasticity is less than unity (as it would be under complete markets.)  This is 
precisely the result in Engel (2001) under balanced trade. 
  But we have argued that some goods are likely to be priced in the producers’ currencies 
and sold to distributors.  In fact, it seems plausible that 
* θ θ +  may be close to one.  For 
example, when a large country sells to a small country, only a small fraction of firms might 
directly market their products, so θ  will be small.  But many of the small country exporters will 
directly market their goods in the large country, so 
* θ  would be large.  It might be that the 
fraction of goods that are marketed are close to the relative size of the country, so θ  may be 
close to  n − 1 , and 
* θ  may be close to n. 
 As 
* θ θ +  approaches unity from above, the response of the exchange rate to monetary 
shocks approaches infinity.  The intuition is easy to see.  With local currency pricing, there is no 
`expenditure switching’ effect of exchange rate changes.  The only effect that the exchange rate 
has on the economy comes through its effect on profits.  A home depreciation raises the profits 
of the θ  home producers that directly sell their products to foreign producers.  But a home 
depreciation lowers the ex post profits of the 
* 1 θ −  distributors in the home country that sell  
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foreign products.  Under balanced trade, when θ  approaches 
* 1 θ − , the two effects cancel out.  
So, with this sort of asymmetric marketing, we can arrive at a situation where nominal exchange 
rate changes have essentially no effect on the economy.  There is no expenditure-switching effect 
because all prices are set in the consumers’ currencies.  And the wealth effects on profits are nil 
as the gains from one sector of the economy cancel with the losses from another sector. 
  Note that this economy may exhibit very high exchange rate volatility without any 
equivalent volatility in real magnitudes.  From (2.2) and (2.5) it is easy to establish that 
consumption and employment are  







(2.9)    







Thus, the volatility in the nominal (and real) exchange rate may be out of all proportion to 
volatility in the underlying economy.  
 
3. Dynamic Model 
  The results so far provide some analytical support for the `disconnectedness’ of the 
exchange rate from the economy.  But the absence of inter-temporal dynamics represents an 
important drawback of the analysis.  Exchange rate changes had little impact on the static 
economy because they did not affect relative goods prices, and through the combination of local 
currency pricing and domestic distributors, both the expenditure switching and wealth effects of 
exchange rate shocks were limited.  But in a dynamic model, an exchange rate shock also affects 
interest rates, and through a combination of uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP; this will hold 
in a linear approximate dynamic version of our economy), and temporary deviations from PPP,  
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monetary shocks drive a wedge between real interest rates facing the home and foreign 
household.  This real interest rate effect allows the exchange rate to play a critical role that is not 
present in the static model.  As we show, the real interest rate mechanism may be important 
enough to sharply limit the volatility of the exchange rate.   
But the real interest rate linkage relies critically upon the validity of UIRP.  As is now 
well known, UIRP does very poorly as an empirical prediction in exchange rate data.  Moreover, 
the literature has been unsuccessful in attributing deviations from UIRP to a risk premium based 
on utility-maximizing behavior.  In fact, the literature has explored a number of possible avenues 
for explaining the deviations from UIRP in terms of a risk premium.  These include 
generalizations of preferences to allow departures from time additivity, or from the axioms of 
expected utility.  Models have explored the role of heteroskedasticity of driving variables, time 
aggregation, frictions in goods markets and consumption externatilities.  Several recent studies 
have attempted to model deviations from UIRP as a risk premium, but have concluded that there 
remain fundamental obstacles to this approach.  These studies include Bekaert (1996), Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Marshall (1997), Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001), and Moore and Roche (2001).  
Engel (1996) surveys earlier literature.  
In light of these developments, it is plausible to turn to small deviations from rational 
expectations to reconcile the evidence on deviations from UIRP.  Evidence from surveys of 
traders in foreign exchange markets has suggested departures from conditional unbiasedness (see 
Frankel and Froot (1987), and Froot and Frankel (1989).)  Jeanne and Rose (2000) develop a 
model of noise trading in foreign exchange markets, where the presence of noise traders 
introduces a time-varying liquidity premium in the excess returns on foreign currency 
investments (or a liquidity premium in UIRP).   In this section, we extend our basic model of 
local currency pricing and international marketing to incorporate a noise-trader generated  
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liquidity premium in foreign exchange rates.   Using the framework of Jeanne and Rose, we 
show that, even in a dynamic model, the link between exchange rates and fundamentals is 
weakened dramatically.  The combination of local currency pricing, asymmetric marketing, and 
the presence of noise-trading liquidity premiums in foreign exchange markets generate the 
fundamental features of `disconnection’ between exchange rates and fundamentals.    
Households 
Households now trade in domestic and international bonds.  Since  incomplete markets 
are critical, our assumption is that households can trade in non-contingent nominal bonds only.   
Household bond trading is defined in a special way however.  First, we assume that households 
can directly trade only in domestic currency denominated nominal bonds.  All home country 
trading in foreign currency bonds is carried out by `foreign exchange dealers’ the activities of 
which will be described more fully below.  Foreign exchange dealers give households a net 
payment of 
f
t Π  per period, denominated in domestic currency, which the households take as 
given.  In fact, this may be positive or negative, as the households may be required to pay in to 
the foreign exchange fund in some periods.  Since foreign exchange dealers act in household’s 
interests, this represents a delegation by households of all foreign exchange transactions to 
specialized dealers.  
The budget constraint of the typical home household is then written as 
(3.1)  11
f
t t t t tt ttt t t t PCd B MW L M TB +− ++ = + Π + Π + + + .          
All variables are defined as before.   t B  is the number of domestic currency denominated bonds 
held by the home household, and  t d is defined as the price of a bond
10.   t Π  represents profit 
                                                 
10 In equilibrium there will be zero net trade in these bonds, but it is convenient to define the equilibrium price  t d .   
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income from production and distribution firms, as defined in (2.1).  
f
t Π  is the payment made by 
foreign exchange dealers at time t.  
Conditions describing optimal behavior for the home household include (1.2), (1.3), and  











=       
which is the Euler equation for optimal choice of domestic currency bonds.  
  Foreign country residents have identical preferences, but trade directly in foreign 
currency bonds.  Given the institutional setup for foreign exchange trading that is described 
below, it is irrelevant whether foreign residents trade directly in foreign currency denominated 
bonds, or have this done by specialized foreign exchange traders.  In addition, we assume that 
foreign residents do not trade in domestic currency denominated bonds.    Accordingly, we may 
write the foreign residents budget constraint as: 
** ** * * * * * * *
11 t t t f t tt t tttf t P Cd B MW L M TB +− ++ = + Π + + +  
where 
*
t d  is the price of a unit of foreign currency delivered in period t+1.  Optimal behavior for 
foreign residents involves the analogous conditions to (1.2) and (1.3), as well as the condition 
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Foreign Exchange Dealers 
In the home country, foreign exchange dealers buy or sell foreign currency denominated 
bonds to maximize the discounted expected returns of cash flow, evaluated at the home 
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t E  represents profit expectations taken by the foreign exchange dealers, and  t d  












q ).  Home country residents receive an amount 
*
th t SB  from foreign exchange 
dealers at time t, and make new payments of 
**
1 tth t dSB+  to the dealers.  Thus, the net amount 




t t ht t t ht SB dSB + Π= − .  This is the current return on the foreign 
exchange fund for home residents.    
  We assume that foreign exchange dealers exhibit bias in their conditional forecasts of the 
future exchange rate.  Thus, they can be thought of as `noise traders’.  Following closely the 
work of Jeanne and Rose (2000),
11 we make the following assumption about noise trader’s 




tt t t t E sE sv ++ =+   
(3.5)        11 () ()
n
tt t t Var s Var s ++ =                                                      
  Here we assume that  t v  is i.i.d. and satisfies; 1() 0 tt Ev − = . The notation  1()
n
tt E x −  refers to 
the conditionally biased expectations of noise traders.  The period t+1 exchange rate expected by 
noise traders based on period t information differs from the true conditional expectation by a 
random error.  But noise traders correctly forecast the conditional variance of the exchange rate. 
Finally, we assume that the conditional variance of  t v  is proportional to the conditional variance 
of the exchange rate itself.  Thus 
( 3 . 6 )        ) ( ) ( 1 1 t t t t s Var v Var − − = κ ,    1 0 < < κ     
                                                 
11 Jeanne and Rose (2000) model the entry and exit of noise traders, which we neglect.  However, the 
macroeconomic model of Jeanne and Rose is not fully developed.  They use an ad hoc monetarist model. 
12 Since our approximate model below is written in terms of log deviations from the steady state, we must make 
distributional assumptions with respect to the logs of the exchange rate.   
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The logic behind condition (3.6) is that the bias in noise trader expectations must be related to 
the volatility of the exchange rate itself, since otherwise, noise traders might anticipate that the 
future exchange rate was volatile, even in a fixed exchange rate regime
13.   
  Finally, we assume that foreign exchange dealers make accurate expectations of the 
households state contingent discount factor t q
14.   
  Assuming that there is no entry cost into the foreign exchange dealing market, but that 
each new (home country) foreign exchange dealer continues to exhibit biased expectations, we 







1 * + =   
Firms 
The expressions for revenue of home and foreign firms are the same as before, and firms 
use the same pricing rules as before.  Now however, a money shock may have long-lived effects 
through its impact on the current account (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff,  1995).   
Model Solution 
The appendix describes the complete solution of the model.  Here we take a heuristic 
approach.  Again, we characterize the properties of exchange rates by taking a linear 
approximation around an initial non-stochastic, symmetric steady state.   Thus, we let lower case 
letters represent log deviations from an initial steady state, so that  ln( ) ln( ) tt x XX =− . In the 
initial steady state consumption, net foreign assets, prices and the exchange rate are all constant.   
Again, we assume that money shocks are given by 
                                                 
13 It may seem strange that the conditional variance of  t v  is proportional to the conditional variance of  t s  rather 
than of  1 t s + .  But in fact, as we show below, the conditional variance of the exchange rate is constant over time.  
14 We could rationalize this under the supposition that there existed a full set of state contingent home currency 
bonds, traded only within the home country, so that the bond prices would reveal the state discount factor.   
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** *
11 tt t tt t mm u mm u −− =+ =+  
where  11 * 0 tt t t Eu Eu −− == .   
To begin with, we may establish that, in a linear approximation, firms will set prices to 
equal anticipated marginal costs 
1 ht t t p Ew − =   
*
1() ht t t t p Ews − =−
15 
A similar result holds for the foreign prices. Together, this implies that the price index for home 
and foreign countries is: 
(3.8)     
*
11 (1 ) ( ) tt t t t t p nE w n E w s −− =+ − +       
 
(3.9)       
**
11 () ( 1 ) tt t t t t p nE w s n E w −− =− + − .       
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) together imply that in an expected sense, purchasing power 
parity (PPP) holds.  Not surprisingly, with one-period ahead pricing and without non-traded 
goods, our model does not address the determinants of persistence in the real exchange rate.  
 
Interest Rate Parity 
We may derive the interest rate parity relationships implied by this model by taking a 
linear approximation of (3.3) and (3.7), taking into account the assumption on foreign exchange 
dealer’s expectations (3.4).  This gives  
(3.10)  
** * *
11 11 1 () ( ) () ( ) tt t t t t tt t t t t t t t t E ccE pp E ccE ppE ss v ρρ ++ ++ + −+ − = −+ − + − +   
The expression on the left hand side of this equation has the interpretation as the 
domestic nominal interest rate.  The first two expressions on the right hand side represent the 
                                                 
15 Although the foreign currency price of imports from the home country depends on the price set both by home 
firms selling directly to the foreign market, and foreign retailers, it can easily be shown that they both set the same 
price, up to a linear approximation.   
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foreign nominal interest rate.  Equation (3.10) then says that the presence of conditionally biased 
expectations, introduces a stochastic deviation from uncovered interest rate parity.  The source of 
this deviation is precisely the bias in expectations of the future exchange rate.  It is important to 
distinguish between this deviation from UIRP and deviations due to conventional risk premium 
terms, which would arise from risk aversion and Jensen’s inequality terms in the true non-linear 
solution (as opposed to the linear approximation).  These conventional risk-premium terms tend 
to be both very small and have little variability (see Engel, 1996.)  By contrast, the liquidity 
premium arising from noise-traders is on average zero, but displays volatility that is proportional 
to the exchange rate itself.  
Equation (3.10) also implies that while UIRP may fail due to expectational shocks on the 
part of noise traders, it holds in expected value.  Conditional on period t-1 information, nominal 
interest rate differentials reflect expected changes in exchange rates.   
Solving for expected values 
Now using (3.8), (3.9), and a linear approximation of (1.3) and (2.5), (and the equivalent 
for the foreign country), and taking expectations dated t-1, we get 
(3.11)     
**
11 () ( )
(1 )





.         
Take a linear approximation of the balance of payment constraint (3.1) (after imposing home 
money market equilibrium  1 ttt M MT − =+, and the equilibrium relationship for profits of the 
producers and foreign exchange dealers), using the fact that (as will hold in equilibrium) in an 
expected sense, any initial change in net foreign assets is persistent, and then using the pricing 
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− + − − − = − − − β ω    
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This says that relative home consumption is increasing in the change in the initial home country 
expected net foreign asset position, and decreasing in the expected terms of trade (as long as 
1 ω > ).  Equations (3.11) and (3.12) give a relationship between the expected consumption 
differential and the initial net foreign assets:  












= − − σ
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.  An increase in the home country net foreign assets leads to an 
anticipated rise in home consumption, relative to foreign consumption
16.  Net foreign assets 
represent the only persistent state variable in the model.  
Now take a linear approximation of the home and foreign money market conditions, 
using condition (3.13), and take expectations.  This gives us the solution for the expected 
exchange rate 
(3.14)      
**
11 1 ()( ) tt t t t t t t E sEmm Ecc ρ −− − =− − − .       
In an expected sense, the exchange rate is consistent with the standard monetary model.  
Effect of Money shocks on exchange rates 
Now let  1 ˆ t x xEx − ≡−  represent the deviation of a variable from its expected value, where 
the expectation is dated t-1.  Thus,  1 1 1 1 ˆ + − + + − = t t t t t t x E x E x E , etc.  Now, from the linear 
approximation of the balance of payments constraint, we can establish that 
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The right hand side of (3.15) represents the relative wealth impact of unanticipated shocks to the 
exchange rate.  As in the previous section, if 
* 1 θθ +> , an unanticipated depreciation raises 
relative wealth of the home country.  This relative wealth increase will then be spread between 
an increase in relative home consumption, and net foreign asset accumulation.  
Using (3.13) (updated to period t+1) in equation (3.15) gives us a relationship between 
current relative consumption, expected period t+1 relative consumption, and the unanticipated 
movement in the exchange rate:  
(3.16)     
***
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () ( 1 ) tt t t t t cc E c c s
r
σ
θθ ++   −+ − = −−         
 What is the relationship between current relative consumption and anticipated future relative 
consumption?  Take the interest rate parity equation (3.10), and take expectations dated t-1.  
Since PPP is expected to hold at time t+1, and the current price level in both countries is 
predetermined, we may subtract the dated t-1 expected value of (3.10) from (3.10) itself to get 
(3.17)    
**
11 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ () ( ) tt t t t t t E cc c cs v ρρ ++ −=− − +       
Expected consumption growth in the home country decreases in response to an unanticipated 
exchange rate depreciation, since this generates an unanticipated real depreciation, therefore 
reducing the home country real interest rate. But a `noise’ shock, representing a shock to foreign 
exchange traders expectations of the future exchange rate, will raise the home country real 
interest rate.  This leads to a rise in expected home country relative consumption growth.  
Now putting together (3.16) and (3.17), we obtain a relationship between the 
unanticipated movement in the exchange rate and the unanticipated movement in relative 
consumption.   
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Finally, from the linear approximation to the money market equilibrium, and using (3.14) and 
(3.17), we may establish that  
*








so that the unanticipated movement in the exchange rate is  
(3.19)      
*
*
ˆˆ (1 )( )
ˆ
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Unlike the static model of the last section, there is still a determinate exchange rate when 
* 1 θθ += .  This is because, through the interest rate parity condition (3.17), the relationship 
between expected future consumption and current consumption is affected by the movement in 
the exchange rate.  That is, the exchange rate determines the optimal response of the current 
account to a money shock.  
Can the exchange rate display `excess volatility’ in this environment?   Recalling 
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Given that the volatility of the conditional bias in noise traders expectations is determined 
by exchange rate volatility, the conditional volatility in the exchange rate depends only on  
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fundamentals; i.e. on the volatility in relative moneys.  Moreover, from an examination of (3.20), 
we may establish the following proposition 
Proposition 
As 
* 1 θθ +→  from above, and for  1 = κ , the conditional volatility of the exchange rate 
rises without bound.  
Proof.  From examination of (3.20).  
Thus, the presence of local currency pricing, combined with asymmetric distribution and noise 
trading in foreign exchange markets, implies a degree of exchange rate volatility that may be far 
in excess of the underlying shocks.   
  The intuitive explanation of the proposition comes from combining elements of the 
previous section on the static environment and the additional presence of noise traders in this 
dynamic economy.  As before, the presence of local currency pricing and domestic distributors 
tends to remove both the substitution and the wealth effects of exchange rate movements, at any 
point in time.  But without noise traders, an unanticipated shock to the exchange rate will drive a 
wedge between the real interest rate in the home and foreign country.  For instance, an exchange 
rate depreciation in the home country will reduce the relative real interest rate in the home 
country, and tilt the path of consumption so that home consumers will wish to consume more in 
the present, relative to the future. Then, from (3.13) and (3.16), the movement in the exchange 
rate is limited by the degree to which the current account must adjust to maintain an expected 
future level of consumption (governed by the parameter σ ), even if 
* (1 ) θθ −− is very close to 
unity.   
  In general, equation (3.16) and equation (3.17) with the expectational noise omitted 
reveal why exchange rates will not be volatile under interest parity when there is local-currency 
pricing.  Any depreciation of the home currency implies an increase in wealth, as the domestic  
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currency value of foreign sales increases.  This works to increase both current and future 
consumption, as equation (3.16) demonstrates.  But a depreciation in the current period raises the 
real exchange rate today relative to the real exchange rate in the future.  (This period’s real 
exchange rate rises one-for-one with the nominal exchange rate when there is local currency 
pricing.  The future real exchange rate is fixed by long-run purchasing power parity.)  So by 
interest parity (3.17), a current depreciation must raise current consumption relative to expected 
future consumption (holding foreign consumption constant.)  Disconnect means that current 
consumption does not change much when the exchange rate changes.  The interest parity 
condition then only allows large increases in the nominal exchange rate and disconnect to occur 
simultaneously when there are large drops in expected future consumption.  But this contradicts 
the implications of the wealth effect of the depreciation, which must engender a rise in expected 
future consumption.  We can conclude that interest parity precludes exchange rate volatility 
under local-currency pricing. 
  But when exchange rate forecasts are biased by noise trader errors, and the conditional 
volatility of these errors are proportional to the exchange rate, then exchange rate volatility is not 
limited by the response of the current account, because of the direct presence of noise trader 
shocks which also drive a wedge between home and foreign real interest rates.  Holding the  t v  
shock constant, we see from (3.19) that the response of the exchange rate is limited by the inter-
temporal current account parameters.  But this does not effectively limit the magnitude of 
nominal exchange rate volatility, because the (conditional) volatility of  t v  itself is proportional to 
exchange rate volatility.  
Moreover, the critical implication of our model is that exchange rate volatility exceeds 
that of other relative prices and aggregate variables.  To see this, we note the following.  First, 
from the money market equilibrium conditions (1.2), and the analogous condition for the foreign  
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economy, it may be established that the nominal interest rate in each country is constant.  This 
implies that consumption in each country responds in the same way as equation (2.8).   Second, 
given that nominal prices are predetermined in each economy, it is easy to show from the labor 
market clearing condition (2.5) (and its equivalent for the foreign country) that employment and 
output in each country responds identically to shocks to world consumption; (i.e. 
by
* ˆˆ (1 ) tt nc n c +− ), as in equation (2.9).  Therefore, again, consumption and output volatility is 
proportional to the volatility of the monetary `fundamentals’.  

































* (1 ) 1 θθ −− →  from above, the response of the current account to a money shock approaches 
the negative of the response of relative consumption.  Moreover, any impact of the noise trader 
shock  t v  tends to be eliminated.   
Finally, we may establish that as 
* (1 ) 1 θθ −− →  from above, the response of the home 
country real interest rate to money disturbances converges to  




−−− −  
We draw the conclusion that the path of all real variables in the economy is essentially 
independent of exchange rate variability.  The combined presence of local currency pricing, 
asymmetric marketing, and `noise-trader’ conditionally-biased expectations in foreign exchange 
markets generates the possibility for a degree of short term exchange rate volatility that is 
completely out of proportion to all shocks impacting on the economy.  Thus, as in the static  
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example above, in the full dynamic economy we may observe the basic pattern of `disconnect’ 
between the exchange rate and the rest of the economy.  
  Table 1 reports some illustrative estimates of the effect of local currency pricing, 
asymmetric distribution networks, and noise trading for the volatility of the exchange rate.
17 
Here it is assumed that the money shocks are uncorrelated across countries, and that each has 
variance unity.  The parameter values used in the calculations are reported at the end of the table. 
For any value of κ , a fall in the value of 
* θθ +  increases exchange rate volatility.  For 
comparison the Table reports the volatility under producer currency pricing, where the volatility 
of the exchange rate is lower, and is unaffected by movements in
* θθ + .  For higher values of κ  
under LCP, the impact of a fall in 
* θθ + on exchange rate volatility becomes dramatic. The Table 
also shows the correlations of the exchange rate with consumption and the home real interest 
rate.  The striking feature is that these correlations remain very low, even as the volatility of the 
exchange rate itself becomes extremely high, in response to a combination of asymmetric 
distribution networks and noise trading.  Thus, our model of high exchange rate volatility 
requires neither a high absolute volatility of other macroeconomic variables, nor a high 
correlation between the exchange rate and these other variables.  The correlation between output 
and the exchange rate is not reported, because in the symmetric case of equal sized countries and 
an identical distribution of monetary shocks across countries, this is in fact zero (this can be 
inferred directly from 3.10 and 4.19).   
 
                                                 
17  Clearly we have not developed a model with which we would try to “match moments” as is done in many 
calibrated models that are solved numerically.  For example, there is no persistence in our model in either price 
stickiness or expectational errors, so we cannot hope to match the persistence of exchange rates.  
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5. Conclusions 
  This paper has made an attempt at developing a fully specified general equilibrium model 
of the exchange rate which accords with the conjecture of Krugman (1989) that exchange rate 
volatility is extreme because fluctuations in the exchange rate matter so little for the economy.  
We show that a combination of local currency pricing, heterogeneity in international price-
setting and goods distribution, and expectational biases in international financial markets may 
combine to produce very high exchange rate volatility without any implications for the volatility 
of other macroeconomic aggregates.   
  We have developed testable hypotheses about the nature of exchange-rate volatility and 
exchange-rate disconnect.  In particular, there ought to be a greater disconnect when the degree 
of local-currency pricing is high and the wealth effects of exchange rate changes are small.  But 
ours is not a fully developed model that is capable of matching all of the empirical features of 
exchange rates. In particular, in order to explain not just real exchange rate volatility but also 
persistence, we might want to have more persistent price setting, and perhaps endogenous capital 
accumulation.  We could pay more attention to the underlying incentives that exporting firms 
have to set up foreign distribution networks, and the pricing structure they use in conjunction 
with this.   We have focused on the extreme case in which there is no expenditure-switching 
effect of exchange rate changes, but a more realistic model would allow for some substitution 
possibilities.  With respect to the presence of expectational errors in financial markets, we could 
explore in more detail the microeconomic foundations of noise traders.   We have merely 
clarified what type of deviation from UIRP is necessary to generate very high exchange rate 
volatility in face of local currency pricing and heterogeneous distribution of products.  
Nevertheless, our results suggest a number of key elements that may be part of the `exchange 
rate disconnect’ puzzle.   
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Here we derive the results that are obtained in section 3 of the paper.  The full model can 
be described by the following 18 equations.  Given the definition of foreign exchange dealer 
profits, consumer price indices, and the conditional bias in expectations, these implicitly give a 
solution for the sequence;
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Equation (A1) is the home country balance of payments condition.  Equations (A2) and 
(A3) represent the labor market clearing conditions for both countries.  Equations (A3) and (A4) 
implicitly define labor supply conditions for each country.  Equations (A5)-(A8) define the Euler 
equations for each country, as well as the expectations-biased form of the interest rate parity 
condition. Equations (A9)-(A16) represent the optimal pricing equations for firms in each 
country
18.  Finally, equations (A17) and (A18) represent the money market clearing conditions.   
                                                 
18 To derive the optimal pricing conditions, see Devereux, Engel and Tille (1999).   
  38
Solution technique 
To solve this system, we take a linear approximation around an initial symmetric steady 
state, where net foreign assets are zero, all prices are equal, and the exchange rate is initially 
unity.  Using lower case letters to designate a deviation from initial steady state, the linearized 
versions of the CPI price indices and equations (A9)-(A16) are given by:  
(A19) 
** (1 ) (1 )( (1 ) )
p D
th t f th t f t f t p np n p np n p p θθ = +− = +− +−  
(A20) 
** * * * * (1 ) ( (1 ) ) (1 )
pD
th t f t h t h t f t p np n p n p p n p θθ = +− = +− +−  
(A21)   1 ht t t p Ew − =  
**


















ft t t t p Ews − =+  
(A24)   1 ht t t qE w − =  
**
1 ft t t qE w − =  
This implies that the CPI prices may be written as: 
(A25)  
*
11 (1 ) ( ) tt t t t t p nE w n E w s −− =+ − +  
(A26)  
**
11 () ( 1 ) tt t t t t p nE w s n E w −− =− + − .  
Linearizing the balance of payments condition (A1), labor market clearing conditions  
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** * * ** * * *
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(A30)  tt t t wp c l ρψ =+ +  
(A31) 
** * *
tt t t wp c l ρψ =+ +  
Finally, the linearization of the Euler equation, the interest rate parity equation, and the 
money market clearing conditions gives: 
(A32)  11 () tt tt t t dp c E p c ρρ ++ =+ − +  
(A33) 
*
11 1 () tt t t t t t t t t dp c E p c E sv s ρρ ++ + =+ − + + + −  
(A34) 
** * * *
11 () tt t t t t dp c E p c ρρ ++ =+ − +  
(A35) 
1




−= +  
(A36) 
** * * 1




−= +  
Now using (A19)-(A26), together with the assumption of i.i.d. shocks, in equations 
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− + − − − = − − − β ω  
(A38) 
**
11 () ( ) ttt t t t t E ll Ewws ω −− −= − −−  
where (A37) represents (3.12) of the text.  Now (A30)-(A31) and (A35)-(A36) give 
(A39) 
** *
11 1 () ( ) ( ) ttt t t t t t t t E wws Ecc Ell ρψ −− − −−= −+ −  
(A40) 
**
11 1 () ( ) tt t t t t t t E sEmm Ecc
ρ
ε




11 () ( )
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which is equation (3.11) of the text.  From (A37) and (A41) we get (3.13) of the text.  
To get (3.15) of the text, take the expectation of equation (A27), and subtract from (A27) 
itself.  Then use (3.13) to derive (3.16).  Equation (3.17) is obtained by combining (A33) and 
(A34),  imposing expected period t+1 PPP.  Then, using (A33)-(A36), we may establish the 






0 = κ  
2
1 ts σ −  
2
1 ts σ −  
(PCP) 
(,) s c ρ (,) s r ρ   * θθ +  
 1.74  0.72  0.044  0.18  2.0 
 1.8  0.72  0.044  0.18  1.75 
 1.9  0.72  0.044  0.18  1.50 
 2.0  0.72  0.044  0.18  1.25 
  2.1 0.72  0.044  0.18 1.0 
      
5 . 0 = κ  
2
1 ts σ −  
2
1 ts σ −  
(PCP) 
(,) s c ρ   (,) s r ρ   * θθ +  
  2.2  0.78 0.04 0.16  2.0 
  2.3  0.78 0.04 0.16 1.75 
  2.5  0.78 0.04 0.16 1.50 
  2.6  0.78 0.04 0.15 1.25 
  2.8  0.78 0.04 0.15  1.0 
      
9 . 0 = κ  
2
1 ts σ −  
2
1 ts σ −  
(PCP) 
(,) s c ρ   (,) s r ρ   * θθ +  
 5.3  1.0  0.025  0.10  2.0 
 6.1  1.0  0.024  0.1  1.75 
 7.2  1.0  0.023  0.09  1.50 
 8.8  1.0  0.021  0.08  1.25 
  11.0 1.0 0.02  0.08 1.0 
Parameter  assumptions:     
8 ω =   1 ψ =   0.1 r =   4 ρ =   0.5 n =    